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ABSTRACT 
 
Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. This article provides a 
critical examination of Afghan anticorruption strategies based on formal 
anticorruption strategy, bureaucratic reform, and counter-narcotics. This article 
includes reference to some of the opinions of 70 semi-structured interviews 
conducted by the author in Kabul during May–June 2010 with anticorruption 
experts, rights-based organizations, civil society groups, ministries, and 
international and national organizations. The findings are that political interference 
from Afghan elites preserves corruption and deep roots of patron–client 
corruption—patronage networks and illicit drug trafficking interests with criminal 
groups for profitable gain—are difficult to combat with the existing anticorruption 
strategy. Hence, new approaches need to be attempted, such as, incorporating 
religion and ethics and empowering local leaders to combat corruption within a 
sixfold approach which involves (i) raising awareness, (ii) prevention, (iii) 
prosecution and sanctions, (iv) detection, (v) a collaborative counter-narcotics 
strategy, and (vi) linking religion. 
 
Keywords: anticorruption, bribery, state capture, patronage, clientelism, drug 
trafficking, religion, Afghanistan 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Afghanistan, the main causes and practices of corruption range from 
administrative corruption, clientelism and patronage, low pay and bribery, 
drug-related corruption to state capture. Corruption in Afghanistan entails 
daily bribery for basic public services and aid cor-ruption that affects the 
poor severely. Civil servants, public sector employees, and law enforcement 
actors—the police and judges—regularly demand bribes to speedup 
transactions as survival-based corruption to supplement low pay.1 In 
addition, parts of the state have been captured 
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by non-state criminal networks and armed opposition groups (AOG) in 
which elites, government officials, and police chiefs serve and protect 
criminals and former President Hamid Karzai’s cronies’ illicit lucrative drug 
trafficking. The government interferes in police, judicial, and anticorruption 
investigations, resulting in either the release of drug mules or avoidance of 
investigation.2 Patron–client relations concerning appointments and 
positions are purchased and sold in lucrative poppy-rich areas in exchange 
for loyalty, and a lump sum or monthly stipend of bribes collected is paid to 
the recruiter or superior.3 In Afghanistan, the root cause of corruption is 
debatable, but it is difficult to challenge corruption and clientelism in a state 
that is run by patronage appointments based on kinship and similar 
interests.4 All of these factors pose challenges to the rule of law, security, 
anticorruption, and more broadly statebuilding.  
This article critically examines anticorruption strategies that attempt to 
combat the aforementioned issues of corruption and clientelism based upon 
70 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in Kabul. 
Bureaucratic reform efforts to curb corruption are critically evaluated. This 
includes the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS); the 
Afghanistan Compact and London, Paris, and Kabul Conferences; Public 
Administration Reform (PAR) and Civil Service Reform; and the 
development and adoption of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-
corruption (HOOAC). The formal anticorruption reform attempted does 
comply with the challenges recognized by powerful international donors. 
This includes reforming state institutions and increasing the salaries of 
public officials and civil servants; good governance, the rule of law, and 
human rights; counter-narcotics and alternative livelihoods; and enhancing 
the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) to raise awareness and 
combat administrative corruption. Yet, it is the state cap-ture and persistent 
patron–client relations—partially derived from the Bonn Agreement that 
empowered warlords into political positions—that have resulted in the 
failure of the formal anticorruption strategy.  
The subsequent part includes the argument that religion and ethics could 
be applied with anticorruption strategy to change these underlying systems. 
Trusted local power-holders can be trained and empowered to curb 
corruption in the countryside and build accountability from bottom-up. The 
article ends with recommendations based on a sixfold approach of 
combating corruption more effectively in Afghanistan by: (i) raising 
awareness, (ii) prevention, (iii) prosecution and sanctions, (iv) detection,  
(v) a collaborative counter-narcotics strategy, and (vi) linking religion. 
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The new Afghan President, Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, has a huge 
challenge of curbing corruption in order to restore faith and legitimacy in the 
state. 
 
Afghanistan National Anticorruption Strategy 
 
Corruption has been acknowledged as a major obstacle to Afghan devel-
opment, which was reiterated in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact5 and the 
ANDS. The role of civil society institutions and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) needs to be strengthened to reduce poverty and 
improve security, eradicate the drug industry, strengthen governance, and 
decrease corruption to enhance stable macroeconomic policies and 
development (ANDS, 2008, pp. 36, 39, 54). Similarly, the ninth aim of the 
Afghanistan Compact (2006, p. 3) is to “combat corruption and ensure 
public transparency and accountability.” Moreover, the Afghanistan 
Compact (2006, p. 7) set targets to ratify the United Nations (UN) 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) with national legislation and 
establish an oversight mechanism to oversee anticorruption strategy 
implementation. The main aim of the ANDS is to plan and implement a 
strategy to benefit the poor in compliance with a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper that is budgeted, sequenced, and prioritized to combat corruption. 
Corruption is a main indicator of poverty. The poor pay a higher slice of 
their incomes as bribes on a daily basis to attain services that should be free 
(Singh, 2014, p. 626).  
Point 9 of the Principles of Cooperation at the London Conference strives 
to curb corruption and guarantee public transparency and account-ability 
(Afghanistan Compact, 2006, p. 2). In addition, the 2020 Vision for 
Afghanistan strives for more accountable institutions for responding to the 
poor that are also involved in decision-making processes, irrespective of 
gender or social status. The Vision hopes for a firm Islamic constitu-tional 
democracy with peaceful relations with its neighbors, a pluralistic nation 
honoring Islamic heritage and participation, justice and equal rights, and a 
developed private sector.  
The three predominant pillars of the ANDS are (i) security; (ii) gover-
nance, rule of law, and human rights; and (iii) economic and social develop-
ment. Security is recognized as a fundamental prerequisite for development 
in the country and the Afghanistan Compact (2006, p. 3) supports the 
International Security Assistance Force, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the close coordination of donors involved in 
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Security Sector Reform (SSR), and backing of the Afghan government to 
establish security and stability. The Paris Conference (2008) aims to imple-
ment the ANDS to achieve the objectives of the Afghanistan Compact to 
serve Afghan security, economic development, and human rights in every 
village and combat corruption and support counter-narcotics efforts.  
The second pillar, governance, rule of law, and human rights, under-lines 
that the Afghan government should enhance accountability and transparency 
within the government. This includes adopting meritocratic appointments in 
the public sector, including the civil service, police, and judiciary, and 
fighting corruption, upholding the rule of law and human rights (Afghanistan 
Compact, 2006, p. 3). In relation to the protection of human rights, the 
National Action Plan for the Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA) has aimed to 
protect women’s equal legal rights, promote better access to justice and 
human rights, security, and opportunities (ANDS, 2008, pp. 14, 36; Paris 
Conference, 2008, p. 3). The NAPWA is a 10-year action plan for 
mainstreaming gender equality in Afghan govern-ment institutions, 
compliant with the Afghan Constitution and the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Moreover, PAR 
is included in the 2020 Vision to encourage the progress and performance of 
institutions with competent merito-cratic appointment-based recruitment, 
including the provincial level to fight nepotism and corruption and protect 
CSOs. The ANDS recognizes that Afghanistan’s public institutions are in 
their infancy, corruption is endemic, legal enforcement to implement the 
laws is dire, parliamentary oversight is weak, gender inequality is prevalent, 
and the judiciary and human rights enforcement are underdeveloped.  
The third pillar recognizes that a liberal market, private sector growth, 
and counter-narcotics are crucial for developing the country’s economy and 
eliminating the threat that the drug industry poses to the Afghan government 
and international security (ANDS, 2006, p. 16; Paris Conference, 2008, p. 
2). The Afghan government is instructed to significantly reduce the 
cultivation and smuggling of drugs with the cooperation of the neighboring 
countries. In addition, the Afghan government has been urged to support 
international interdiction efforts, provide alternative livelihoods for farmers, 
enforce zero tolerance to official corruption, and improve law enforcement 
(Afghanistan Compact, 2006, p. 4). The ANDS, similar to the Afghanistan 
Compact, recognizes that corruption in the public sector, excessive 
centralization, and narcotics-affiliated infiltration are huge obstructions to 
security and development 
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(ANDS, 2008, pp. 21, 55, 63). The ANDS has six cross-cutting issues that 
include counter-narcotics and anticorruption.  
The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), initially prepared in 2003 
and updated on several occasions, has been addressed to the Afghan 
government to establish effective disruption of the narcotics trade by 
targeting smugglers and supporters. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics is 
mandated to implement the NDCS to strengthen alternative licit rural 
livelihoods. This is to reduce the demand for drugs, rehabilitate drug users, 
and enhance both central and provincial institutions that play a key role in 
counter-narcotics and drug interdiction (Kabul International Conference on 
Afghanistan, 2010, pp. 9, 42, 44). In addition, reinforcing the integrity of 
counter-narcotics and publicizing accessible information on donor aid at 
both the central and provincial levels are part of the counter-narcotics 
strategy (ANDS, 2008, pp. 149, 159).  
Despite corruption, the international community has attempted to curb 
corruption by prescribing anticorruption strategies such as the anticorruption 
road map. Afghanistan’s anticorruption road map is based on enhancing its 
leadership, raising awareness, mainstreaming anticorruption across the 
government, enhancing legal enforcement for combating corruption, and 
building the capacity to implement UNCAC (ANDS, 2008, pp. 14, 73). The 
road map was produced by the UN, the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), and the United Kingdom (UK) for the Afghan government to 
effectively target its resources to combat corrupt networks. The specified 
target was to significantly reduce corruption at all levels of the government, 
particularly the security and customs sectors, by the end of 2013 and 
implement a monitoring mechanism to trace corruption at high levels of the 
government and security organizations by the end of 2008. Increased 
monitoring at senior levels and complaint mechanisms and public reporting 
are part of the strategy (ANDS, 2008, p. 64). However, after almost two 
years of nationwide consultations, the ANDS suffered from donors’ lack of 
support and poorly organized prioritization that failed to report on their 
objectives (Jackson, 2010, p. 3). 
 
Moreover, unrealistic time frames have been set in relation to SSR. The 
ANDS states that the Afghan National Police (ANP) will be a com-petent, 
constituted, functional, and professional force by the end of 2010 and meet 
the security needs of the people, and both the Afghan National Army (ANA) 
and ANP will be able to perform missions against external and internal 
threats effectively (ANDS, 2008, p. 56). However, the ANP is 
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the most hated institution in the country and is renowned for corruption and 
incompetence and the ANA is absolutely incompetent to perform 
independent operations.6 Furthermore, the ANDS (2008, p. 194) states that 
the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) are 
responsible for training and strengthening the capacity of the Afghan police 
to enforce law against narcotics smuggling and poppy production by 2013. 
Yet, MoI officials and the ANP are involved in the drug trade. Up to 80 
percent of the Afghan police is profiting from “the drug trade in some 
regions” (Giustozzi & Isaqzadeh, 2013, p. 89).  
Despite the unrealistic time frames set by both London and Paris 
conferences, the ANDS has been particularly useful in establishing the main 
problems that Afghanistan faces. The ANDS (2008, pp. 3–4) acknowledges 
that poverty is widespread, security is dire, the government has weak 
capacity and is corrupt, the country has poor private sector investment and a 
growing drug industry, and these problems will take many years with 
continual international support to rectify. Prevalent corruption in the public 
sector and the security services has discouraged private investors to 
capitalize in risky businesses. In addition, the growing drug industry, as a 
result of insecurity, has fuelled public sector corruption and increased poppy 
cultivation due to the lack of alternative livelihoods. Illegal AOGs 
throughout Afghanistan have close ties with the Afghan police and some 
belong to the local governments heightening corruption, which plays a 
fundamental obstacle in fighting the drug industry (ANDS, 2008, pp. 5–6, 
55). 
 
Public Administration Reform and Civil Service Reform 
 
In Afghanistan, PAR has been installed to build a competent civil service 
that is managed by formal rules in structured and organized central and 
subnational levels. The legal basis of PAR was provided by the Bonn 
Agreement that established the Independent Civil Service Commission, 
which was later extended to the Independent Administrative Reform and 
Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)7 to reform the ministries. The 
IARCSC holds the responsibility of appeals, appointments, management, 
and administrative reform. Merit-based appointments are monitored by the 
IARCSC that includes a recruitment and appeals board. The central 
representative for PAR is the Administrative Reform Secretariat that ensures 
the monitoring over the recruitment of merit-based appointments under the 
2005 Civil Service Law. The IARCSC has three working stages, 
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namely, Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR), PAR, and Pay and 
Grading (P&G) with the responsibility of administrative and managerial 
reform, appointments, and appeals.  
First, PRR was introduced on July 10, 2003, by a decree that restruc-tured 
90 percent of the civil service and has trickled down to all of the ministries 
to raise the fixed-pay scale of important staff. Priority Reform and 
Restructuring includes the planning and implementation of a P&G scheme 
that is complemented with a retraining, redeployment, and reskilling 
program to manage excess civil servants and downsize excess governmental 
staff.8 Priority Reform and Restructuring involves taking examinations to 
ensure that the employees are up to scratch and then they are reemployed 
with higher salaries because “unless you pay the people proper salary, 
you’re going to invite them to be corrupt.”9 However, according to the 
IARCSC (2005), PRR has focused more on pay improve-ments rather than 
the restructuring of ministerial departments’ processes, and therefore 
enforcing competitive-based meritocratic appointments has failed at the 
implementation level.  
Second, PAR was installed to enhance the capability of the govern-ment 
to provide security, basic social services, prepare job descriptions, and 
recruitment. The ADB (2005) initially approved the funds of United States 
Dollar (US$) $105 million for the PAR program to the Afghan government 
that included numerous periodic grants for capacity-building. This was to 
create an administration to reduce poverty, enhance develop-ment and 
economic growth, and improve public services by downsizing ministries and 
reinstating their functions. This strategy was endorsed to eradicate overlaps 
in the same jobs within ministries to achieve better productivity, reduce 
costs, and improve the full use of limited skills. Senior civil servants 
supported their cabinet ministers and deputy ministers and operated as a 
secretary general of each ministry.  
Third, P&G strengthens the competence of public employees by 
improving pay and with a systematic grading system in accordance with 
rank, experience, and skills, with prospects for career progression to 
establish a professional and meritocratic civil service. The recruitment of 
civil servants at Grade 2 and higher is identified by the Independent 
Appointments Board, and the Board reviews the recruitment and promo-tion 
processes for civil servants below this scale, which is carried out by 
governmental ministries. General civil servants at the lowest skill level, 
Grade 10, were paid Afghanistan Afghani (AFN)10 1,818 per month, which 
was increased to AFN 2,058 monthly; Grade 5 increased from AFN 1,848 
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to 2,268 monthly and Grade 1 earned AFN 1,908 per month prior to the pay 
rise which was increased to AFN 2,688 monthly after the late 2003 pay rise. 
This has trickled down to the defense ministry. The ANA pay reform has 
streamlined the senior ranks and increased the numbers of the lower ranks to 
raise the salaries of all ranks, with the lowest ranked Grade E-4 soldier 
earning USD 100–180 per month, second lieutenant Grade O-1 receiving 
$190–270 monthly, and the highest ranked Grade O-10 generals earning 
$880–1,030 per month (Leonard, 2008, p. 20).  
Although there have been many problems with the open and fair 
recruitment process, the Independent Appointments Board has appointed 
1,500 senior civil servant positions utilizing a merit-based appointment 
policy. The World Bank works on civil service reform “to make the civil 
service a more technocratic body subject to the usual restraints and controls” 
and P&G is “trying to actually increase people’s salaries” because “these 
administrators are not earning enough money” and the “prosecutors and 
judges need to be paid higher salaries that actually incentivize them to do 
their job.”11 However, a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) survey of December 2012 in Afghanistan reveals that only 7 
percent of household members applying for the civil service claimed that 
they were unsuccessful due to merit, whereas 51 percent believed that 
cronyism and nepotism were the main practices. Thirty-nine percent said 
that bribes paid played a pivotal role in the public recruitment process 
(UNODC, 2012, p. 19).  
Despite the implementation of the IARCSC and international donor 
support from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
World Bank, and ADB, PAR has been criticized by donors for operating at a 
slow rate. Donors involved have reported that pay reform has been difficult 
to implement in practice (Lister, 2007, p. 6). According to the ANDS (2006, 
p. 16), the Afghan government’s main goal is to provide an “effective, 
accountable, and transparent public administration at all levels of 
government” that include the subnational level.  
However, PAR at the provincial level is difficult due to its distance from 
the capital, which does little to reform the diversity and complexity of local 
patronage appointments. Public Administration Reform attempts to reform 
bureaucracies and control resources to combat patronage systems, but this is 
resisted at the provincial level and PAR is also weakly implemented at 
centralized ministerial levels (Suhrke, 2007). Presidential authorities have 
consequently liaised with less senior levels to form a stronger reliance on 
secretive economic networks. The central 
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government is involved in secretive dealings within the illicit opium 
economy, which involve local governors, power brokers, and warlords in the 
countryside. Moreover, the local government is complex as there are 34 
provinces, with an estimated 364 districts, and each province contains a 
municipality, often with one rural municipality. The local government in 
provinces and districts functions in compliance with centralized policy 
decisions; although flexibility is allowed and some regions are not 
mentioned in the Afghan Constitution, they are utilized for administrative 
convenience. 
 
Development and Practice of the HOOAC 
 
In July 2008, the HOOAC was established by the Presidential Decree to 
work with departments and ministries to reduce bureaucratic opportunities 
for engagement in corruption, enhance public information via education, and 
raise awareness from outreach programs to the civil society. The HOOAC 
was enacted under Section 3 of Article 75 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution 
to eliminate administrative corruption with Article 142 of the Constitution to 
create necessary offices and Article 6 of UNCAC to oversee the strategic 
implementation of anticorruption practices. The Afghan government ratified 
UNCAC on August 25, 2008. The preamble of UNCAC recognizes that 
corruption weakens the security and stability of the country and undermines 
institutions, democracy, sustainable development, justice, and the rule of 
law.  
The HOOAC is regarded as the highest office for coordination and 
implementation of Afghanistan’s national anticorruption strategy, which 
includes UNCAC to investigate government corruption and retain 
independence from political interference. The sincere aims of the HOOAC 
are to fight corruption through coordination, prevention, and raising 
awareness, which are the methods used in approaches to curb corruption. 
The HOOAC immediately launched a nationwide “TV and radio 
anticorruption campaign” including asset declaration for senior government 
officials, established a collaborative website for Afghans to complain about 
corruption and officials, and created a corruption complaints office to deal 
with hundreds of verbal and written complaints every week (The Asia 
Foundation, 2009). In addition, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) 
is mandated to counter drug offences, organized crime, and corruption, 
where it refers information to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), 
HOOAC, and the police, and 
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allegations against high-profile officials are submitted to the president who 
decides the further course of action.  
The HOOAC has no prosecution powers; therefore, monitoring is the 
High Office’s main anticorruption strategy that oversees the enactment of 
government offices regarding the implementation. However, only 15 cases 
have been transferred to law enforcement agencies, which have resulted in 
only a handful of arrests (Arnoldy, 2010). Furthermore, planning has been 
done by the majority of ministries, such as, the 17 articles of the MoI, but 
implementation has not yet been stamped into the ministries. Cooperation, 
coordination, and capacity at the governmental level concerning 
Afghanistan’s anticorruption strategy are inadequate and the HOOAC is 
absent at the provincial level, similar to the Afghan central government. 
Hence, corruption has been formally addressed, but no real action has been 
undertaken to move beyond political rhetoric and unfilled pledges (Jackson, 
2010, p. 2).  
Despite the creation of the HOOAC to boost awareness and investigate 
corruption cases, it is not truly independent from the Afghan government, 
which can override or ignore challenges on government officials, and does 
not exercise independence in corruption cases. Therefore, the High Office 
remains attached to the Presidential Office and is unable to reduce political 
interference, particularly in high-profile cases, and corruption is prevalent in 
all sectors across Afghanistan.12 Political interference is the outcome when a 
high-level official is probed with drug or corruption allegations, which 
retains their immunity from prosecution and abolishes law enforcement and 
application of existing antidrug and anticorruption laws.13 It has been 
contended by the Country Director of Global Rights that the HOOAC is 
unconstitutional and futile in performing independent investigations of 
corruption.14 It is also argued that it will take a genera-tion or more for 
Afghan state justice to be less corrupt and function at basic standards.15 
 
Similarly, the Control and Audit Office (CAO) is attached to the Office of 
the President and lacks independence and capacity due to weak laws and 
political interference to perform its financial auditing of government 
agencies.16 Moreover, the HOOAC has an ineffective relationship with the 
AGO, runs under the control of the president, is politically manipulated, is 
understaffed, has inadequate powers to pursue investigations, and most 
employees lack experience or competence to deal with complex corruption 
investigations (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
[SIGAR], 2009, p. 6). For instance, the 
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High Office has slowly started publishing the asset declarations of senior 
government officials, but some have refused to complete these despite the 
request of the Office and former President Karzai. The HOOAC is unwilling 
to commence reforms. Further investigations are avoided when they are 
deemed politically sensitive. It is contended that the HOOAC Chief, 
Mohammad Yasin Osmani (at the time of interview), applies flexibility and 
“leaves cases on the shelf” to avoid holding certain figures with political 
connections accountable.17 Moreover, Karzai appointed Azizullah Lodin, 
the ex-head of the International Election Committee who was previously 
dismissed in 2009 over election fraud, as the new HOOAC Chief. 
 
In Afghanistan, the roots of corruption have spread to the top level and 
eradicating these corrupt officials will remove the main root of corruption, 
but a mafia-style system of untouchables makes this difficult.18 It is argued 
that more robust commitment is required from the top to implement the laws 
“whether they are weak or revised”; however, “the unfortunate thing in this 
country is that we never hit them with any laws.”19 Powerful drug lords 
associated with the Karzai government have the “freedom to travel and 
network” (Hafvenstein, 2011, p. 125), and are virtually immune from 
prosecution due to unstable security conditions (Saghafi-Ameri, 2010, p. 
227). For example, former President Karzai pardoned five convicted 
narcotics traffickers caught with over 260 lbs of heroin who were sentenced 
to 16 and 18 years imprisonment, including Karzai’s 2009 election campaign 
manager, Bilal Wali Mohammad (Farmer, 2009). This indicates that all 
judicial bodies are manipulated and ineffective due to influential patronage 
networks, a lack of national political will to enforce existing laws, and 
endemic corruption, which allows empowered persons or groups to evade 
their legal accountabilities.  
Civil society is either skeptical or unaware of the HOOAC and IARCSC’s 
fight against corruption. In relation to raising awareness and the competence 
of agencies fighting corruption, such as the HOOAC and IARCSC, only 44 
percent and 48 percent of Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) survey 
respondents had heard of these, respec-tively (IWA, 2010, p. 31). In 
addition, 63 percent stressed that there had not been any improvements and 
26 percent did not know whether they believed that there had been some 
improvements in the reduction of corruption in any public institution over 
the past year (IWA, 2010, p. 31). This demonstrates that the civil society is 
not thoroughly included in combating corruption, and lacks the knowledge 
of certain anticorruption 
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bodies and “strengthening civil societies”; raising awareness and changing 
behavior via media and education are needed for future anticorruption 
reform (Azami, 2009).  
Poor leadership in the Afghan Supreme Court and the government has 
failed to stamp out corruption and proceed and support the HOOAC’s 
investigations.20 It is difficult to enhance leadership with the current “Head 
of State in Afghanistan” but if there is someone really dynamic in the 
Supreme Court and other robust reformers who “throw people in jail for 
violations then it’s possible to combat corruption.”21 Currently, political will 
does not exist in Afghanistan due to the lack of independence of key 
institutions such as the HOOAC and Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF). 
These institutions are undermined by political interference; for example, 
former President Karzai protecting his political cronies, which hinders 
investigations of corruption at the senior level. 
 
It helps if an important person like a governor can help stamp out corruption by 
being serious but corruption is a part of business in provinces and throughout the 
system. So it is possible but we don’t have people like that in the court or in the 
government. It’s going to be a challenge.22 
 
Similarly, the leadership and political will of the senior officials within the 
government and its ministries need to be stronger to stamp out corruption, 
but this is a generational shift where formal education is needed which could 
take 20–30 years for the government to show strong leadership and political 
will.23 Stronger political will is needed in a few leaders who are serious 
about actually fighting corruption because currently the Afghan state and all 
its efforts are failing with leaders changing the laws and decrees to suit their 
interests.24 This is clear evidence of state capture. Manipulation by the 
Afghan leaders preserves their immunity from being held accountable for 
illicit activities, drug trafficking, or corruption which “undermines the High 
Office of Oversight’s activities.”25  
To illustrate, in 2007, a blanket immunity law pardoned ex-members of 
Afghan armed factions for international humanitarian law (IHL) and human 
rights abuses perpetrated before December 2001. Article 3 of the National 
Reconciliation, General Amnesty and Stability Law grants all belligerent 
parties and actors involved in fighting from 1972 to 2002 “unconditional 
immunity from prosecution.” This was enacted by two-thirds of the 
parliament and did not need the signature of former President Karzai, subject 
to the Afghan Constitution, as underlined by 
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Karzai’s spokesperson, Wahid Omar. “Parliament is made up largely of 
former warlords who were accused by Afghans and human rights groups of 
war crimes” (Leopold, 2010). 
 
60 per cent of parliamentarians are accused of genocide and massacres but they 
still remain in Afghan parliament. Most have been involved in massacres killing 
thousands during the seven year war but still serve in parliament as the justice 
system is weak and the parliament is too strong. In cases of murders, kidnaps and 
robbery, the police catch them but no one knows what happens next. Once there 
was a suicide bomber from Pakistan and he came to Kabul and Karzai pardoned 
him and sent him back to Pakistan with a few hundred lakhs.26 
 
Karzai’s cabinet consists of leaders of Mujahidin factions and both the vice 
presidents were responsible for thousands of civilian casualties, but the 
amnesty law has pardoned them of their retrospective crimes. The UN 
(2010) and Human Rights Watch (2010) argue that the Amnesty Blanket 
Immunity Law should be repealed immediately by the Afghan government 
to prosecute individuals responsible for IHL and human rights violations and 
avoid releasing these perpetrators from the judicial and correctional 
processes. The blanket amnesty infringes former President Karzai’s 2006 
“Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice” to combat impunity, 
accountability for human rights violations, vetting potential political 
candidates, institutional reform, truth-telling, and documenting past abuses. 
Yet, Justice Minister Assadullah Ghalib argued that repealing the Amnesty 
Law would further destabilize the country and government efforts to 
reconcile with insurgents such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who would be 
accountable for his rocket attacks in Kabul that had killed thousands of 
innocent civilians during the Mujahidin civil war. 
 
A truly independent Afghan anticorruption agency is lacking which has 
failed to raise awareness and build the capacity of the civil society. The High 
Office does not have legislative powers to investigate cases of corruption, 
and is futile when attempting to investigate elites and con-nected criminals. 
 
 
Political Imperatives: Drawbacks of Anticorruption Strategy 
 
When donors try to develop policy initiatives for anticorruption in targeted 
countries, failure is often the outcome. Donors fail to comprehend 
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vast differences between the targeted country that is recovering from conflict 
– suffering from frailty of a private economy, a weak civil society, political 
parties’ interests, and limited capacity to hold externally driven reforms, 
such as, a liberalist market democracy. It is useful to have donors with 
financial capital and ideas for policy initiatives to combat corruption in 
targeted states, but there are many constraints in a state undergoing conflict 
or a country just emerging after war, and corruption in each country differs 
(Cheng & Zaum, 2008, p. 307). Hence, a one-size-fits-all approach on 
international anticorruption would be futile. In addition, combating 
corruption, particularly in a recovering a war-torn state where a peace 
agreement or interim political arrangement has bought off a few prominent 
warlords and factions for peace, is not always the best peace-building 
strategy (Philp, 2008, pp. 310, 324).  
Despite the anticorruption rhetoric in Afghanistan, it can be argued that 
anticorruption only reached the policy level in the ANDS and Paris 
Conference in 2008, which led to the creation of the HOOAC and the 
MCTF, but corruption has not been institutionalized or theo-rized. 
Unrealistic time frames are commonly set by donors. Yet, these initiatives 
are agreed to by the Afghan government, such as, establishing an efficient 
and publically trusted police force, incorporating a strong rule of law, and 
having a more transparent and less corrupt government within five years in 
the ANDS (2008). International officials argue that Afghanistan is a large 
and rural country, and thus filling the void with higher numbers of hastily 
trained police, even if deemed corrupt, is better than nothing, but the 
problem is not the absence of local police admin-istrations, rather these 
corrupt institutions “do more harm than good” (Wilder, 2007, p. 57). 
 
The Afghan government has clearly been seized by powerful non-state 
criminal actors who influence political infiltration during the investigations 
of corruption and drug-related crime concerning powerful drug traffickers 
and senior officials affiliated with the drug trade to serve criminal and 
political interests. In addition, patron–client relations include ruthless and 
lawless Northern Alliance warlords who lobby with the president due to the 
international community’s short-term bargaining strategy—the Bonn 
Agreement—for peace and cooperation in the countryside to hunt the 
Taliban. The blanket amnesty, political interference, and cronyism are the 
main obstacles to inquiries and investigations concerning graft and grand 
corruption, which negatively impact anticorruption efforts and lead to the 
impotence of the HOOAC. 
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Failure of Anticorruption Strategy: Narcotics and Religion 
 
Currently, the counter-narcotics strategy has reduced poppy cultivation but it 
still generates lucrative income and there are few alternative means of 
economic necessity to reduce the incentives of Afghans engaging in poppy 
cultivation. Poppy cultivation is very lucrative for many farmers in 
provinces across Afghanistan and there are few alternative means of 
livelihood that provide similar revenue.  
Sufficient alternative livelihood programs will not only counter narcot-ics 
but also reduce incentives for engaging in any illicit activities involved in 
the opium industry, from cultivation to trafficking, which will help combat 
drug-related corruption. Alternative livelihood programs at the agricultural 
level can provide farmers with opportunities to grow licit crops rather than 
the illicit poppy crop.27 This will result in fewer farmers growing poppy, and 
will thus weaken the narcotics trade that fuels the insurgency and heightens 
insecurity. Similarly, the International Relief and Development (2008) states 
that almost one-third of the people in Afghanistan (7.4 million) are 
susceptible to join the insurgency to feed their families due to low economic 
security, low household income, and low agricultural productivity. 
 
However, the current anticorruption strategies have failed to com-bat 
corruption in Afghanistan. The counter-narcotics strategy is failing because 
the drug trade is far more profitable than the alternative liveli-hoods offered. 
Alternative livelihood strategy has not prevailed because of poor alternatives 
to poppy cultivation, which generates 17 times more revenue than wheat. 
Moreover, the Taliban protect farmers and collect taxes, which has 
heightened insecurity, particularly in southern Afghanistan. 
 
Despite the futile counter-narcotics efforts, Afghanistan still contrib-utes 
92 percent of the global annual opium production—7,333 tons out of 7,922 
tons of worldwide opium from 2006 to 2009, which is worth an estimated 
US$ 65 billion and kills 100,000 people annually (UNODC, 2009, p. 30). 
Afghan security forces thereby engage in corrupt activities and drug 
addiction is a problem in the police and the military.28 One in five ANP 
recruits test positive for drugs, namely, heroin, and are engaged in 
corruption (Nordland, 2010). Anticorruption strategies are predomi-nantly 
based on the ideals of powerful Western donors and institutions; the 
strategies are externally driven, and do not fit in systems of kin-ship and 
patronage. Western agencies are not connected to the culture, 
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conditions, and systems of the Afghan state where kinship and patron-age 
are prevalent. Religion and ethics could lead to better planning and 
implementation at the policy level.  
Along with law and order and security, religion, colonial heritage, and 
ethical and dispute traditions are important parts of the social, economic, and 
political life of the Afghan state. Failure to reform state institutions in 
postwar states or states undergoing armed conflict, which uphold reli-gious 
and ethical traditions as a means of everyday society, can actually intensify 
such movements and support traditional methods of legalism and ethics 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2008, p. 335).  
Adopting religion into anticorruption strategy led to the success of the 
National Integrity Plan in Malaysia, which increased the pride and integrity 
within the police force in a society that holds strong religious and spiritual 
values, and is supported by ethical practice and behav-ior (Embong, 2007, p. 
156; Razak, 2006, p. 9). Similarly, Falola (1998, pp. 274–275) contends that 
the Nigerian government should concentrate on the religions of Islam and 
Christianity and their ethics to overcome immoralities, such as corruption, 
greed, and violence, which will lead to meritocracy and fairness when 
competing for jobs and political office.  
Linking religion to anticorruption is very important, particularly in an 
Islamic state. In Afghanistan, the Mujahidin radicalized religion to fight 
against the Soviet invasion. In addition, the Taliban is radicalized by Mullah 
Omar to fight Western intervention and destroy America. Mullah Omar 
opened up Afghanistan for Bin Laden and other rich and powerful Islamic 
activists, and they advanced radicalism which resulted in international 
segregation and a strict Islamic regime. Mullah Omar taught in a “madrasa” 
and radicalized refugees in Pakistan camps by inspiring his students to arm 
themselves to capture and kill the abusive and unjust warlords who 
terrorized, raped, and murdered local Afghans to fulfill Allah’s work. The 
Shaldara madrasa located in the Pashtunabad district, Quetta, Pakistan, has 
allegedly recruited and radicalized vulnerable young men who join “the 
Taliban as suicide bombers in Afghanistan” (Gohel, 2009, p. 137). 
 
Although the Taliban and Al-Qaeda did not initially share the same 
ideology, the Taliban became radicalized under jihadist ideas to ward off 
Western intervention after the US coalition military campaign during 
October and November 2001. After the US invasion, the Afghan Taliban 
fled the country and entered Pakistan to radicalize the Pakistani Taliban. 
Mullah Omar and the Taliban shared Bin Laden’s ideological 
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position, which previously led to the destruction of Bamiyan’s Buddhas, 
arrests of Christian humanitarian aid workers, and Omar’s declaraton on 
November 15, 2001, to the British Broadcasting Corporation to destroy the 
US.  
A Mullah is required to rise and intertwine religion in the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan in order to promote an ideology and national pride to curb 
corruption because “Mullah Omar radicalized the Taliban via religion and 
this insurgency fights constantly with little remuneration. However, try 
telling this to the international community. They will never put religion at 
the basis of anti-corruption strategy.”29 During the 1990s, the lower 
Mujahidin police “were not engaged in corruption because they worked for a 
mandate; to protect people and have national pride for Afghanistan” but this 
has now been lost.30 The IWA’s Afghan public corruption survey (2010, p. 
95) also underlines that Mullah and Ulema (55 percent of survey 
respondents) are the best institutions to efficiently combat corruption, with 
only 25 percent claiming that they would not be efficient to do so. Mullahs, 
Ulema, and other trusted local power-holders can be trained and empowered 
to raise awareness about anticorruption, counter-narcotics, and human rights. 
In addition, this can build accountability from the bottom-up approach. In 
Helmand, com-munity councils can contain 300 elders discussing legal 
rights and other issues and the Human Rights Commission trains the Shura 
members to consolidate discussions “to their Mullahs.”31 
 
Anticorruption strategies in Afghanistan are merely based on secular 
Western ideals and implemented in short-term programs via bilateral and 
multi-donor projects with different goals. Without a system or 
institutionalization, the mind-sets are not changed for corrupt think-ing; 
therefore, even if the police are paid more, say even £40,000 or much higher, 
they will still do corrupt things.32 More Western aid and external short-term 
policies driven by the international community for statebuilding will 
increase corruption by forming more revenue and opportunity. 
 
The major problem of corruption in Afghanistan is that it is multi-faceted: 
administrative and systemic corruption, aid corruption, patron-age, and state 
capture. This has been recognized, that is, it has been mentioned in the 
ANDS (2008), but it is the political imperatives of anticorruption strategies, 
often externally driven by powerful Western donors, agencies, and 
institutions, that contribute to the failure of curbing corruption in 
Afghanistan. 
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Conclusion 
 
Much of the international aid spent on Afghanistan is for reforming the 
security forces and most of it is wasted by graft. Corruption and clientelism 
are difficult to challenge as both are systemically rooted in the Afghan 
government and make it hard for poor families to afford public services that 
expect bribes, which is accepted as a norm for getting things done. Former 
President Karzai has granted amnesty and nominated warlords who were 
notable human rights violators during the 1990s into his cabinet, protects his 
political cronies from prosecution, and transfers rather than dismisses 
ministers and governors involved in drug-related corruption. In addition, 
notorious drug mules affiliated with the government are released 
immediately when arrested by the police.33 Pyman, Cohen, Boardman, 
Webster and Seymour (2012, p. 33) also recognize that Afghan police 
officers continue to release detainees who have been arrested for drug 
charges in exchange of bribes, and some bribes for Taliban detainees can 
reach US$ 10,000.  
Bribery is usually affiliated with low pay, which is why PRR and P&G 
scaling has been installed to remove survival-based corruption because many 
civil servants at the subnational level are living in poverty and struggling to 
cater for their families. Azfar and Nelson Jr (2007, p. 471) state that, 
“Increasing government wages and increasing the difficulty of hiding 
corrupt gains both reduce corruption.” Afghan anticorruption strategy 
features P&G to raise the salaries of lowly paid public sector employees to 
avoid survival-based corrupt practices of bribery and extor-tion. Corruption 
is mainly associated with bribery, weak law enforcement, and drug 
trafficking. Administrative corruption, aid corruption, state capture, and 
patronage are the multiple causes of corruption that interact and are 
interpenetrating.  
Despite the anticorruption efforts, low capacity of the HOOAC and 
efforts of the MCTF and other anticorruption units have failed to challenge 
impunity within the Afghan government. No minister or pro-vincial 
governor has been indicted for acts of corruption. State capture and political 
corruption seriously hinder the effectiveness of the rule of law, justice, 
meritocracy, and anticorruption efforts, strategies, and units because the 
government and political elites are manipulated into drug-related corruption 
by the infiltration of non-state criminal interests.  
Other anticorruption strategies include alternative livelihood programs to 
combat poppy cultivation, which can assist anticorruption efforts. 
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However, alternative livelihoods have failed to provide incentives for 
farmers to surrender lucrative poppy cultivation and the anticorruption 
strategy is driven by donors who assist in drafting unrealistic goals. In 
addition, the role of religion and ethics as a strategy to combat corruption is 
not taken seriously in Afghanistan, which is a state based on kinship and 
patronage that makes curbing corruption a challenge for the Western 
agencies.  
All these problems with anticorruption are due to the political imperatives 
of the international community that supported Tajik Northern Alliance 
warlords during the Bonn Agreement to fight the Taliban. As a result, 
donors and NGOs have focused on security objectives and have funded 
CSOs. Most importantly, the HOOAC is still hindered by Afghan political 
interference and remains attached to the Presidential Office. Therefore, 
systemic corruption and clientelism in a weak and narco-state with fragile 
institutions and a legacy of warlordism—the patrons who distribute state 
resources to clients in exchange for loyalty—is extremely difficult to 
combat, particularly in Afghanistan. This is due to these deep roots of 
corrupt patron–client relations that were reinforced by the international 
community and former President Karzai, resulting in state capture, 
cronyism, and the amnesty law that should be repealed. An alternative 
approach such as adopting religion and enhancing the role of powerful local 
leaders, such as, Mullahs and Ulema, could have an impact on combating 
corruption and human rights abuses by elders discussing such issues at 
community councils and building accountability from the bottom-up process 
as well. These trusted figures in the countryside can wage a jihadist war 
against corruption, which deteriorates the morals and ethics of an Islamic 
state. This would be similar to how Mullah Omar radicalized the Taliban 
against Western intervention.  
Besides pay reform that can increase the salaries of the Afghan security 
forces and judges, with further reform, to reduce corruption due to the lack 
of economic necessity, other factors are required to strive toward a 
comprehensive anticorruption strategy. This is to fight systemic corrup-tion, 
clientelism, and state capture, including the government, security, and 
judicial institutions that serve and protect lucrative drug interests of illegal 
criminal networks, armed groups, and corrupt elites. The strategy is based on 
the six points raised in international and successful domestic anticorruption 
strategies, namely, (i) raising awareness, (ii) prevention, (iii) prosecution and 
sanctions, (iv) detection, (v) a collaborate counter-narcotics strategy to 
challenge state capture, and (vi) and linking religion 
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with anticorruption. A holistic anticorruption strategy for Afghanistan, 
which reflects on the literature and interviewee responses on how to benefit 
the reform of both security and justice sectors includes the following 
recommendations to reduce corruption and clientelism over time: 
 
 
1. Raising awareness  
 
i. Publication of documents on anticorruption, reporting pro-
cedures, and rights  
ii. Anonymous whistle-blowing when making complaints against 
public officials  
iii. Legal training and education on legal practice, human rights, 
and corruption  
iv. Promoting a culture of zero tolerance—no immunity for crimes 
of corruption and repeal the amnesty law  
v. Transparency in public procurement to ensure that all funds are 
not misused  
vi. Revised Police Code of Conduct (for consistency) and more 
familiar community police  
vii. Strong communication between all the various stakeholders, 
institutions, and agencies involved in all reforms and anti-
corruption strategies to avoid wasted capital   
viii. High media coverage, naming, and shaming—for education/ 
moral deliberation  
 
2. Prevention  
 
i. Raise the salaries of the civil service, security, and justice actors 
to prevent individual and organization deviancy and compete 
with the private sector to enhance incentives for educated, 
honest, and trustworthy applicants   
ii. Promote private competition so that markets can compete for 
economic growth  
iii. Promote PAR to reduce overlapping of functions and oversight 
from IARCSC of civil servants and ministerial equivalents  
 
iv. Follow constitutional procedures as there are anticorruption and 
antidrug laws that are often not pursued—resist political 
interference and abide by laws  
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v. Boost the capacity of CSOs as pressure points to voice/cam-
paign against corruption and promote human rights, such as 
gender justice at the Jirga and Shura levels   
vi. Understand nepotism and conflicting interests as an initial 
anticorruption policy  
vii. Quarterly auditing and monitoring, including funds from 
external bodies, per diems, and salaries to police the misuse of 
funds and financial remuneration benefits   
viii. Build the capacity of the government and the justice and security 
institutions  
ix. Stronger vetting procedures to ensure that all appointments of 
public officials and security and judicial personnel are 
meritocratic and not based on clientelism or other corrupt 
means, including governors and police chiefs bidding for posts 
at poppy-rich provincial levels  
 
3. Prosecution and punishment/sanctions  
 
i. Empower the HOOAC, Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) and the 
AGO’s specialized units to investigate corruption cases 
independently that are free from political interference and third-
party infiltration   
ii. Enforce accountability—independent judiciary to apply harsher 
disciplinary procedures, fines, and custodial sentences for 
corruption and drug offences   
iii. Transfer HOOAC, ACU, and AGO-investigated cases to the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Supreme Court to try and 
prosecute crimes of corruption  
 
4. Detection  
 
i. Maintain MoI and MoJ control with internal investigation units  
 
ii. Build the capacity of the HOOAC and IARCSC legal author-ity 
complaints procedure to boost the quality of the services dealing 
with corruption claims   
iii. Build the capacity of the CAO to monitor fiscal spending and 
control funds to detect embezzlement of funds in public office  
iv. Ensure that all international monies and activity are tracked by 
the Afghan Ministry of Finance so that transparency is endorsed 
at both ends, not only international actors  
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monitoring Afghan fiscal activity but also spending from 
international agencies being traced.  
v. Empower the HOOAC as the highest level of oversight with 
independence to truly implement UNCAC and laws contained in 
the Afghan Constitution to curb corruption  
 
5. Collaborative counter-narcotics system (CCNS)  
 
i. Ensure that all Afghan ministries have a functional and internal 
collaborative counter-narcotics system (CCNS) and 
communicate with each other to enforce existing antidrug laws 
and follow the procedure under the Afghan Constitution   
ii. Promote the understanding of state capture by political elites 
related to drug smuggling and lucrative illicit deals leading to 
criminal activity and corruption   
iii. Increase the political will of international donors to work with 
the new government on enforcing anticorruption strategy as a 
main priority of the ANDS and future conferences and reduce 
political intrusion in such efforts   
iv. Install more legal authority for the AGO, ACU, HOOAC, and 
the MCTF to investigate all forms of corruption, especially drug 
trafficking that is prevalent at the southern (trading) provincial 
level   
v. Support measures/regulations that protect these specialized 
anticorruption units from political interference in major cases, 
even if political aides   
vi. Install the NDCS to fight illicit poppy cultivation   
vii. Continue the promotion of alternative livelihood programs, such 
as the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in 
Agriculture Plus; Afghanistan Water, Agriculture and 
Technology Transfer; and Roots of Peace. This is to help 
farmers cultivate substitute crops to weaken poppy incentives 
that fund the insurgency which causes nationwide insecurity  
 
6. Linking religion to anticorruption strategy  
 
i. Training on morality and ethics to empower the role of Mullahs 
and Ulema that links the detriments of corruption and human 
rights abuses with Islam   
ii. Enhance capacity of the local organizations and CSOs to train 
and/or include trusted local figures—such as Mullahs and 
Ulema—in anticorruption and basic rights dialogue  
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iii. Anticorruption and basic rights dialogue can commence in 
community councils—at the Jirga and Shura level—to have a 
greater impact and higher inclusion rates in the countryside  
 
iv. Empower trusted local figures and the civil society at the 
community level in order to enhance accountability from the 
bottom-up levels also   
v. Link cultural values, ethics, morality, and religion with anti-
corruption and basic rights dialogue to wage a religious effort to 
curb corruption  
 
In sum, the Afghan state is fuelled with corruption that has also hindered 
security and justice. It is imperative that the new Afghan president take 
anticorruption very seriously to boost legitimacy and development of the 
state and deter the insurgency and drug trafficking. The lessons that can be 
learned from this case are largely based on the bureaucratic reform efforts to 
combat corruption that has reduced the overlapping of duties and increased 
the wages of the civil services and public officials. However, bargaining 
with warlords in exchange for short-term peace by including human rights 
abusers in cabinet positions intensifies drug-related corruption and further, 
the patron– client relations have destabilized security and the rule of law. 
Prevalent corruption and weak overly centralized legal systems in the 
countryside have resulted in Taliban resurgence to fill the void. The Taliban 
has utilized religion and morality to fight the Afghan government and the 
West. Other countries can learn that in non-secular societies, formal 
anticorruption strategy can help but it is religion and the empowerment of 
trusted local power-holders such as religious figures—rather than warlords 
to merely fight an insurgency—that can help to wage a religious war to oust 
corruption. 
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NOTES 
 
  1. Author interviews with the Advisor of the Afghan Civil society Forum (ACSFo), 
Kabul, June 1, 2010, 10:45; Program Director for Law, Human Rights and Women’s 
Empowerment of The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan, Kabul, May 26, 2010, 16:00; 
Project Coordinator of the Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD), 
Kabul, May 27, 2010, 12:00; Justice Sector Support Program Legal Consultant to 
the AGO, Kabul, May 29, 2010, 15:00.  
 
  2. Author interviews with the Deputy Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission (AIHRC), Kabul, May 27, 2010, 09:00; Deputy Executive 
Director of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD): 
Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program (AREDP), Kabul, June 1, 
2010, 12:00; Peacebuilding and Public Relations Manager of ACSFo, Kabul, June 1, 
2010, 11:00; Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
 
  3. Author interviews with the Director of the American Institute of American Studies, 
Kabul, May 26, 2010, 15:00; Head of Access to Justice Program for The Asia 
Foundation, Kabul, May 26, 2010, 16:00; Senior Rule of Law Advisor of the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP), Kabul, May 30, 2010, 14:00.  
 
  4. Author interview with the Resident Director for Elections of National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, Kabul, June 3, 2010, 15:30.  
  5. The Compact was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1659 (2006).  
 
  6. Author interview with the Country Director of Flag International Afghanistan, Kabul, 
May 26, 2010, 11:00.  
  7. This Commission was established on May 23, 2002 via Presidential Decree No. 257 
which was then regulated to Decree No. 26 on June 10, 2003 which extended the 
duties of the Commission into an IARCSC.  
  8. Author interview with the Executive Director of International Assistance Mission 
(IAM), Kabul, Monday May 31, 2010, 14:00.  
  9. Author interview with the Executive Director of IAM, Kabul, May 31, 2010,   
14:00.  
10. As on January 23, 2015, AFN 57.3792 amounts to USD $1.   
11. Author interview with the Operations Officer for the World Bank’s Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), Kabul, June 5, 2010, 11:00.  
12. Author interview with the Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
 
13. Author interview with the Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
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14. Author interview with the Country Director of Global Rights—Partners for 
Justice, Kabul, June 3, 2010, 17:30.  
15. Author interviews with the Senior Rule of Law Advisor for USIP, Kabul, May 
30, 2010, 14:00; Attaché—Justice, Rule of Law and Human Rights of the 
European Union (EU) Delegation to Afghanistan and Office of the EU Special 
Representative, Kabul, June 6, 2010, 17:45.  
16. Most CAO cases submitted to the AGO are returned with no action taken 
(SIGAR, 2011, p. 77).  
17. Author interview with the Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
 
18. Author interview with an employee of the NDS, York, December 2, 2011, 
16:00.  
19. Author interview with the Advisor for the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
 
20. Research assistant (with author present) focus group with students of the 
Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kabul University, Kabul, June 6, 2010, 
09:00.  
21. Author interview with the Team Leader of USAID’s Afghanistan Rule of Law 
Project (ARoLP), Kabul, June 3, 2010, 16:15.  
22. Author interview with the Team Leader of ARoLP, Kabul, June 3, 2010, 16:15.  
 
23. Author interview with the ARTF’s Operations Officer, Kabul, June 5, 2010, 
11:00.  
24. Author interview with the Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
 
25. Author interview with the Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
 
26. Author interview with the Peacebuilding and Public Relations of ACSFo, 
Kabul, June 1, 2010, 13:00.  
27. Supplying and educating farmers to grow grapes, almonds and pistachios are 
alternative means of livelihoods (author interviews with the Country Director of 
Flag International Afghanistan, Kabul, May 26, 2010, 11:00; Country Director 
of Roots of Peace, Kabul, May 30, 2010, 18:45).  
28. Author interview with the Country Director of Flag International Afghanistan, 
Kabul, May 26, 2010, 11:00.  
29. Author lunch conversation with the Chairman of the Post-war Reconstruction 
and Development Unit (PRDU), York, February 3, 2012, 14:30.  
30. Ibid.   
31. Author interview with the Department for International Development Justice 
Advisor: UK Aid, Kabul, June 6, 2010, 13:00.  
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32. Author lunch conversation with the Chairman of the PRDU, York, February 3, 
2012, 14:30.  
33. Author interviews with the Deputy Chair of the AIHRC, Kabul, May 27, 2010, 
09:00; Deputy Executive Director of MRRD: AREDP, Kabul, June 1, 2010, 
12:00; Peacebuilding and Public Relations Manager of ACSFo, Kabul, June 1, 
2010, 13:00; Advisor of the HOOAC, Kabul, June 4, 2010, 14:00.  
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